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ABSTRACT
Thispaper isconcerned with three types of incentive programs. First, individual
wageincentives that cause a worker's efforts to have a major effect on his pay. Second,
group incentives in which the pay of an individual is determined by the output of a
group of workers—a group can be as small as a four member work team or as large as
the whole firm. Finally, seniority based payment schemes in which the pay of a worker
rises rapidly with his tenure with the firm. We show that these payment schemes have
the effects in practice that we would predict from optimizing behavior by workers.
We find that group incentives tend to compress the productivity distribution of
workers. This is because the relative performance of the most productive workers tends
to fall, and the most and least productive workers have relatively high quit rates when
workers are paid on group incentives. We also present evidence that suggests that the
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This paper is concerned with three types of incentive programs. First, indi-
vidual wage incentives that cause a worker's efforts to have a major effect on his
pay. Second, group incentives in which the pay of an individual is determined by
the output of a group of workers -agroup can be as small as a four member
work team or as large as the whole firm. Finally, seniority based payment
schemes in which the pay of a worker rises rapidly vith his tenure with the firm.
We shall examine whether these payment schemes have the effects in practice that
we would predict from optimizing behavior by workers.
1. AIMS OF INCENTIVE PROGRAMS
Individual incentives are chosen to motivate employees to work hard and to
help the firm retain its most able workers. Because each employee is paid in
accordance with his own output, a payment schedule can be chosen to induce the
optimal level of effort on the part of employees. In addition, since this wage
schedule typically results in substantial pay differences between the top and bot-
tom deciles of workers by ability, the more able workers are less likely to quit and
the less able workers more likely to quit than if each received the same wage.
Unfortunately, individual wage incentives also have significant drawbacks. Work-
ers are not motivated to cooperate with one another, and serious moral problems-2-
(and grievance procedures in unionized plants) can result from inequalities in the
payment schedules across jobs. Consequently, considerable resources must be
allocated to evaluating jobs.
Often workers spend time waiting for parts or have their output hindered by
faulty equipment. Under individual wage incentives managerial decisions about
the impact of these "special conditions" on worker performance may cause friction
and result in grievances.
Finally, and perhaps most important, workers may view technological inno-
vations as providing management with an opportunity to tighten rates. The
threat posed by any single innovation to an individual worker is greatest if that
worker is paid price-rate and the technology affects his job. Hence, resistance to
new technology is likely to be greatest in firms using individual wage incentives.
Group incentives avoid many of these drawbacks, but at the expense of less
motivation for high effort and lower rewards to high performance workers. For
any payment schedule, the larger is the group, the lower is the motivation for an
individual worker to exert himself: If the average worker in a 100 member group
were to double his output, the output of the group would only rise by only 1%,
and for any reasonable pay schedule the individual's earnings would not be
significantly affected. Similarly, because the most and least able workers within
each group receive the same wages, those pay differences that help firms retain
their most able workers are effectively eliminated. On the other hand, group
incentives encourage co-operation among members of the same group (especially if
groups are small) and reduce friction over perceived inequities in rates (tight rates-3-
for any one job have only a trivial effect on the group wage incentive of workers
assigned to that job).
Although wage incentives are generally thought of as payment systems that
link the output of workers to their pay, wages can have incentive effects even
when pay is unaffected by output. For example, pay schedules in which earnings
or the value of pensions increase rapidly with seniority provide strong incentives
for workers to stay with the firm. In this case the behavior that is being affected
by the incentive mechanism is the quit rate of workers.
We shall examine the effect of piece-rate, group wage incentives and seniority
based wages on the output and quit rates of workers.
2. GROUP VS. INDWIDUAL INCENTIVES
The evidence in this section comes from three plants of a large electronics
manufacturer based in the U.S. Because the same patterns were observed at all
three locations, we only present data from the largest of the three plants.
The firm pays its workers on a non-linear individual piece-rate schedule
when they are first hired, and uses a group incentive pay system for its experi-
enced workers. The initial piece-rate schedule provides significant financial incen-
tives for workers to exert themselves. For a worker performing at 60% of the
expected output on his job, a 1% increase in his output increases his pay by .7%.
For a worker performing at at 115% of expected output, a 1% increase in output
increases his pay by 1.2%. Once a worker achieves 83.5% of the expected output
for his job he is placed in a pay group in which his pay is proportional to the out--4-
put of the group. The vast majority of workers are on group incentives by their
3rd month with this firm. The average pay group has 126 members. Thus, for
experienced workers there is almost no direct financial reward for high output.
By examining the change in the output of workers as they switch from indi-
vidual to group incentives we can obtain a measure of the relative impact of indi-
vidual and group incentives on performance. By comparing group incentives with
individual incentives in the same plant, we avoid many of the drawbacks of previ-
ous studies of the effects of incentives on worker behavior. In particular we
ensure:
a)that changes in payment schedules are not associated with radically
different supervision (few of :he workers changed supervisors when
they went from individual to group incentives) and
b) that the observed effects of individual incentives are not due to better
monitoring of output under individual incentives. (Output under a
measured daywork system can be as much as 20% greater than the
output under the same time-rate pay system but without careful
records of individual output.)
Insert Figure 1 Here
As was mentioned, in the firm we're studying all newly hired production
workers are paid on individual incentives. By their fourth month on the job
almost all of these workers are on group incentives.-5-
In Figure 1 we plot the change in output from their first to fourth month on
the job for newly hired production workers. These workers were ordered on the
horizontal axis according to their normalized output in the first month.' Thus the
circled dot denotes a worker whose normalized output in the first month was
approximately 205% of the expected level for his job and whose output in month
4 was approximately 120% of the level expected for a fully trained worker on his
job. (All the workers in Figure 1 had jobs requiring fewer than 4 months experi-
ence in order to be fully trained. After the fourth month we did not discern any
increase in physical output on these jobs.)
As can be seen almost all the workers whose first month performance was
above the median decreased their output between months one and four. On the
other hand, only half of the low performing workers decreased their output
between months 1 and 4.
This effect is accentuated if we focus on workers whose first month output
was more than 10% above or below the median. Among workers whose first
month output was more than 10% below the median, 79% increased their output.
Out of the 208 workers whose first month output was more than 10% above the
median only 1 worker increased his output.
These effects are unlikely to be due to random noise or measurement error
causing convergence toward the mean. As we see in Figures 2a and 2b, among
workers who completed their training within 4 months the variance of output is
1Recorded output was normalized by the industrial engineers to adjust for differences in
the expected output of experienced workers on the different jobs and for differences in the
difficulty of learning the different jobs.-6-
much lower during their 4th month on the job than during their first month.
This same pattern held at the two other locations of the firm which we studied.
Insert Figure 2 Here
It is of course possible that the industrial engineers miscalculated the
difficulty of learning different tasks. These errors would be likely to increase the
variance of recorded normalized first month output. When we estimated the
effect of the reported time needed to learn a jth on normalized first month out-
put, we found that, after correcting for the personal characteristics of the work-
ers, the workers that were assigned to jobs that took longer to learn reported
higher levels of normalized first month output.2
In Figure 2c we first removed the effects on normalized output of our esti-
mates of the industrial engineer's overassessments of the difficulty of learning
complex tasks. We then recorded these adjusted output levels as a percentage of
the man of the recalculated output levels. (Thus we forced the mean of the
renormalized output levels to be equal to 100. For experienced workers who are
off the learning curves for their jobs the mean normalized output level as com-
puted by the industrial engineering force is 100.2.)
Comparing Figure 2c with Figure 2a it is apparent that our renormalization
decreases the variance in the first month output of workers. However, comparing
the output equation that we estimated, the coefficient of the logarithm of required
training on normalized output was 5.6. It is this distortion which we sought to eliminate
by the renormalization described below. Workers were randomly assigned to jobs so we
did not need to correct for job assignment effects.-7-
Figure2c with Figure 2b it is also apparent that, even after the renormalization,
the variance of the first month output of newly hired workers is still far higher
than the variance of the output of those same workers during their fourth month
on the job.
The data described in Figure 1 retains its same qualitative features if renor-
malized output is used as the measure of first month performance rather than the
normalized output reported by the industrial engineering force.
Of course, even after performing this renormalization, it is still possible that
the wide distribution of the output of newly hired workers relative to the distri-
bution of their output after four months of employment is due to larger measure-
ment errors in calculating he output of the newly hired workers than in calculat-
ing the output of experienced workers.3
It is also possible that the collapse in the distribution of the output of experi-
enced workers relative to new hires is due to convergence to some "natural" level
of performance.
Insert Figure 3 Here
The data presented in Figure 3 casts doubt on these explanations. Figure 3
uses English data from the Industrial Health Research Board to construct the dis-
tribution of the output of piece-rate workers on production jobs as a percentage
3For example, the industrial engineersmay be underestimating the difference between the
expected output of experienced and inexperienced workers on some jobs while overestimat-
ing this difference for other jobs --onthe other hand, their assessments of the relative
difficulty of different jobs for experienced workers could be accurate.-8-
of the mean output of workers on their jobs. This distribution is much wider
than the normalized output of experienced workers at any of the plants we stu-
died, a phenomenon which appears inconsistent with either the measurement
error for newly hired workers or convergence hypotheses.
This English data, along with the data presented in Figures 1 and 2, suggest
that it is the movement of workers from individual to group wage incentives, cou-
pled with the socialization process within the plants we studied, that caused the
output of workers to converge to some (artificial?) standard.
Workers whose output is low are exhorted by their supervisors and
threatened with dismissal unless they reach a satisfactory output level for their
job. Those workers either quit or push themselves to reach the standards. The
more able workers, on the other hand, have only trivial financial incentives to
achieve high levels of output, and often their co-workers exhort them not to
"break the rates." Workers correctly anticipate that exceptionally high perfor-
mance by one worker will cause management to re-evaluate the expected output
for that worker's job. Hence, the most able workers are likely to work less hard
than they would under piece-rate pay.
Because of pressures to shirk, the high ability workers may even work at
lower levels than they would under an unmonitored wage system where there is
no peer pressure not to "break the rates." In another location of this firm, in
which there were no wage incentives and little use was made of individual output
records, the top decile of workers on a job often performed at more than twice
expected the output for their job, while the bottom decile was at 70-80% of-9-
expected output. Thus it would appear likely that at least some workers on
group wage incentives might be working slower than the pace at which they
would be most comfortable.
The firm is accustomed to having few high performance workers and so does
not penalize a supervisor for not having any super-starsamong his workers. Con-
sequently, supervisors concentrate on either pushing the low performance workers
to work harder or to quit, rather than encouraging their most able workers to
achieve the high levels of output of which they are capable.
Because group incentives do not reward high performance, and becausepro-
motional opportunities in this plant were nih, we would expect the most able
workers to oe more likely to quit to work for a firm in which their performance is
rewarded either directly through higher pay or indirectly through more rapidpro-
motions.
Insert Figures 4a and 4b Here
As we can see in Figure 4b those workers whose output was highest (the 5th
quintile) are the most likely to quit within their first 18 months on the job. These
quits may be due to the attraction of better alternative opportunities at firms
where individual output is rewarded, or, alternatively, these quits could be due to
discomfort on their present job caused by pressures from their co-workers not to
achieve high levels of output.
The least able workers also have higher quit rates than the average workers.
For those low ability workers, pressures by their supervisors to achieve an- 10-
"acceptable"output level make their jobs unpleasant. They may also be pres-
sured to quit by supervisors, whose own performance evaluations are strongly
affected by low output workers. These effects seem strongest for newly hired
workers, so the relatively high quit rates of low ability workers are most notice-
able for quits within the first 6 months of employment. The factors inducing the
high ability workers to quit seem to take longer to have their full effect. The
impact of relatively high quit rates of the most able workers is thus most notice-
able for quits within the first 18 months of employment. This general pattern
that the best performing and the worst performing workers were most likely to
quit was also present in the other plants we studied.
Insert Figure 5 Here
In Figure 5 we see the total effect of the switch from individual to group
incentives on the distribution of performance. The distribution has collapsed. By
their sixth month on the job there are few workers performing either 10% above
or below the median level. This collapse of the output distribution is due to attri-
tion at both ends of the output distribution and to a slackening of the effort of
the more able workers relative to the effort of the less able workers.
Most of the literature on wage incentives has focused on the effects of piece-
rate type payment schemes on the behavior of workers. However, wages can be
linked to aspects of behavior other than output to provide incentives in those
areas.— 11—
3.SENIORITY BASED WAGES
As we mentioned in Section 1, a firm that wishes to discourage quits could
pay wages that rise steeply with seniority. Employees of that firm are paid less
than the value of their contribution to output when they areyoung and more
when they are old. Hence, after a few years of employment the worker has a
strong incentive to stay with the firm. In effect, the employee has made a loan to
the firm that is only fully repaid if the employee remains with the firm until
retirement. The size of that loan initially increases as the workers stays longer
with the firm. A firm offering wages that rise steeply with seniority would expect
to find that its more senior employees are much less likely to quit than are its new
Eres.
We shall test this hypothesis with data from a large Japanese electronics
manufacturer. In that firm the average 50 year old male high school graduate
earns 4-1/2 times as much as the average 20 year old male high school graduate.
Graphs of the average wage as a function of tenure are presented in Figure 6.
Insert Figures 6a and 6b Here
We also plot the quit rate for different tenure groups. Quits fall rapidly with
seniority. This decline in quits is much more dramatic than in the U.S. and is
also much greater than in medium sized or small Japanese firms. U.S. and
smaller Japanese firms also offer wages that rise less rapidly with seniority than
do the wages illustrated in Figure 6. Hence, it would seem that the decline in
quits is due to the incentive effect of the steep wage-tenure profiles, rather than to- 12-
workerheterogeneity which would cause quitters to quit early and give a similarly
rapid decline of quits with seniority.
Insert Figure 7 Here
By reducing quit rates, these steep wage-tenure profiles have indirect effects
on other managerial decisions of the firm. In particular, we would expect firms
that offer steeper wage-tenure profiles to invest more in recruiting and training
their workers --sincethose workers will on average stay longer with the firm
whose investments are more profitable. The evidence supports this hypothesis.
Large Japanese firms that offer wages that rise rapidly with seniority also invest
heavily in training and recruiting an elite work force.
To sum up:
1. When pay groups are large, a group wage incentive program does not ade-
quately motivate the most able workers, nor does it dissuade those workers
from quitting.
2.Linking pay to seniority lowers quit rates and increases the pay-off from
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THEIR FIRST 18 MONTHS OF EMPLOYMENT
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To get salary in doflars, divide by 235
AGE
1981 MONTHLY BASIC SALARY DISTRIBUTION FOR WHITE COLLAR,
MALE HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES BY AGE
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MALE WORKERS AT A LARGE JAPANESE MANUFACTURER
QUIT
RATE
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FIGURE 7